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Expropriations of foreign property and political alliances: a 




This paper proposes a classification of government expropriations of foreign property 
based on the types of alliances sought out by governments in their quest for support for 
those actions. Based on a review of historical literature and social science studies of 
expropriations in Sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America in the twentieth century, we 
define three types of alliances: with organized labor; with domestic business owners or 
with sections of the civil service or the ruling party. We posit that each sector allying 
itself with the government expects rewards from the expropriation. We maintain that the 
type of alliance is determined by several factors, in particular, the longevity and 
legitimacy of the nation-state of the expropriating country; the strength of organized 
labor; and the political participation and strength of the domestic business sector. Our 
framework complements existing studies explaining when and why expropriations take 
place. 
 
Keywords: expropriation – economic nationalism – nationalization – indigenization – 




Over the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, the world has witnessed three periods 
during which several governments took over the assets belonging to foreign investors 
operating in their territory.  The first wave of expropriations took place in the 1920s and 
1930s when revolutionary governments expelled foreign firms (particularly in the energy 
sector) and replaced them with domestic state-owned firms.1  The second and largest 
wave occurred in the 1960s and 1970s when the governments in Latin America and 
recently decolonized African and Asian countries took over the operations of major 
multinational corporations in the natural resource, infrastructure, and industrial sectors.2 
The third wave of expropriations took place in the early twenty-first century. Due to the 
historical approach of this paper, we do not analyze that wave but hope our taxonomy 
will provide analytical tools to understand it.3These very visible instances of economic 
nationalism against foreign investors have been widely researched in business history, 
political economy, and international business. While political economy and international 
business have sought to establish general theories that explain expropriations across time 
and space,4 international business history has often focused on discrete instances of 
expropriations, explaining the historical particularities of individual cases.5 
We argue that to conduct an expropriation of foreign private property, a 
government needs to build an alliance of different actors that expect to gain some rewards 
from the expropriation.  We maintain that the nature of the alliance depends on several 
characteristics of the host country that include the longevity and legitimacy of the nation-
state and the strength of organized labor. Our definition of the different types of political 
alliances contributes to existing explanations of when and why expropriations take place. 
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Political alliances help us to understand how the expropriations take place in terms of the 
political strategies behind these actions.  Based on our case narratives, we define three 
distinct types of alliances built to conduct expropriations of foreign property: 
 
(a) A political alliance between the government and the domestic organized labor 
(b) A political alliance between the government and domestic business owners 
(c) A political alliance between the government and domestic civil servants. 
 
We do not believe that this framework of different domestic political alliances which 
drive the timing and form of expropriations are exhaustive, but rather that they establish 
an important pattern that can only be seen by comparing the rich and detailed historical 
accounts of individual cases. We hope our paper can be a starting point for other studies 
defining other types of alliances with other constituencies. 
We conduct our study through a comparative historiography approach.  This 
means we draw on a synthesis of existing historical (and social-scientific) accounts in 
place of direct archival research. This approach was first advocated in 1958 by Fritz 
Redlich, in recognition of the valuable and reliable archival research that underpins 
historical research monographs. He questioned why historians would frown on the 
“systematic use of the resulting material, derisively called ‘secondary,’ [which] appears 
as somewhat absurd, when the goal is highly sophisticated synthesis and not a mere 
narrative.”6 Business history in particular has relied on single case studies, with 
comparative or industry-wide research being less common. Similar concerns about the 
lack of structured approaches to synthesize the insights from individual studies, has led to 
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the development of explicit approaches to synthesis in related research areas, such as 
meta-ethnography.7  
To our knowledge, few scholars have sought to explain the differences between 
full and partial expropriation, as well as nationalization vs. indigenization.8 Scholars have 
noted that economic nationalism may occur on a sliding scale ranging from punitive 
taxation, over local content requirements to complete expropriations.9 Others have 
focused on the timing of expropriation, or which industries have been targeted.10 
However, we believe that there are important domestic political, social, and economic 
factors that influence how countries seek to enact expropriations that are relevant to 
understand their historical trajectories. To elaborate our point, we compare the history of 
seven countries in Latin America and sub-Saharan Africa to show that expropriations 
followed different political agendas. 
Due to the geographic and temporal range of our cases, we do not present primary 
archival research, which would be beyond the scope of an article. As historians, we 
believe in the value of primary archival research to obtain new knowledge of the past, but 
we also see a role for comparative historiography that allows us to build on the existing 
knowledge from multiple in-depth historical case studies across different regions.  
 
The Expropriation of Foreign Property: Why, Where, and When 
 
Existing explanations for the expropriation of foreign property mostly come from other 
social science disciplines, such as international business, international political economy, 
and international law. They mostly take a broader, more international view that aims to 
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theorize the conditions under which states may take foreign property. These explanations 
converge around a set of reasons for expropriations listed in table 1. Authors do not 
necessarily put forward a single explanation at the expense of all others, as becomes clear 
from the list below, but combine different reasons in their argumentation of why, where 
and when expropriations occur. 
 
Table 1 about here 
 
 When trying to understand why developing countries expropriate foreign property, 
explanations have focused on abstract concepts such as ideology, symbolism, and 
fairness. For example, rulers who perceive that the country’s level of poverty is the result 
of a history of foreign exploitation might decide to ensure national control over “the 
commanding heights of the economy,” that is to say, over strategically important 
industries.11 Kobrin, however, cautioned that ideology’s role as the main driver for 
expropriation only applies for the mass expropriations resulting from state takeovers led 
by Communists.12 Another justification for expropriation may be based on the 
unwillingness of multinationals to re-negotiate existing contracts that are perceived as 
unfair to the host country.13  
However, not all explanations perceive ideology or symbolism as key to decision-
making and instead assert that governments expropriated because they had gained the 
capability through acquisition of technology or because the international conditions were 
favorable to expropriations.14 Most studies of expropriations, however, went beyond 
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these general explanations of why this occurred towards taking into account the where 
and when as well.15  
 Apart from the mass expropriations in Eastern Europe after World War II, most 
expropriations of foreign property in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries have 
occurred in less developed or emerging economies. This has led many scholars to focus 
on where expropriations take place. Explanations broadly focus on 1) the industrial sector 
affected by the expropriation, and 2) the institutional characteristics of the expropriating 
nation-state. Expropriations in the natural resource sector (including oil, mining, and 
agriculture) represented around 40 percent of all expropriations during the 1960s-1970s 
wave.16 Although those expropriations garnered the most press coverage and prompted 
the most diplomatic tensions, that wave of expropriations also included a significant 
amount of expropriations in the manufacturing sector (27 percent) followed by finance 
(12 percent) and trade (5 percent).17 In the great majority of the cases (90 percent), the 
expropriations were selective, as they targeted particular firms or industries.18 The 
strategic importance of the sector for the expropriating country is key to understanding 
this pattern. 
 Many scholars have assumed that democracies are more effective at protecting 
foreign investors than autocratic states.19 However, others have argued that in countries 
where political turnover is high (whether they are democracies or dictatorships), rulers 
will assume a short-term horizon in defining their actions and will be tempted to 
expropriate foreign firms and obtain the short-term gains from the expropriation without 
dealing with the long-term problems.20  Ultimately, many scholars agree that 
expropriations are more likely to occur in countries with “weak institutions,” usually 
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defined (as critics have pointed out) as not sharing the institutional framework of Western 
liberal democracies.21  
 Using a neo-Marxist lens, the so-called dependency scholars studied 
expropriations as one of the tools used by peripheral countries’ dominant classes to 
reduce their subordinate role in the global economy.  For Dos Santos, the expropriations 
of export industries that took place in Latin America in the 1930s and later on in the 
1960s aimed to gain domestic control over the main source of hard foreign currency.22  
The rationale, according to Dos Santos, of these initiatives was to use this foreign 
currency to fund an industrialization process that would eventually break the 
expropriating country’s dependency status. By the very nature of how the world 
economic system works, Dos Santos posited, this end of the dependent status never 
materialized, but was replaced by another type of dependence. Evans confirms this point 
by showing how hard it was for the Brazilian bourgeoisie to control multinational 
corporations (particularly in research and development) while at the same time trying to 
increase the nation’s economic output.23 Dos Santos added that in the 1960s and 1970s 
the peripheral bourgeoisie took advantage of what they perceived as a general weakening 
of the United States in the global sphere (reflected in the catastrophic Vietnam war) to 
either expropriate foreign property for their development programs or to take initiatives 
to collectively weaken the power of the multinationals with organizations such as OPEC 
or the Non-Aligned Countries.24  Regardless of any revolutionary language used by most 
expropriating governments, most dependency scholars agree with the idea that the 
working classes did not usually lead expropriations.25   
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 Studies addressing when expropriation is likely to occur, focus on the technical 
characteristics of the expropriated firm or industry, the evolution of international prices 
of the product under foreign control, and general international trends in the political 
economy. Kobrin provides a simple explanation of the rationale of expropriation policies 
by arguing that, once the benefits of placing a particular industry in foreign hands no 
longer justify the costs and regulation involved, a government might find it more 
beneficial to expropriate.26 Combining several of the previous elements in a single model, 
Medina, Marcelo, and Kim maintain that expropriation of foreign firms is more likely to 
take place when the host government has limited capability to monitor taxation (after all, 
taxation of several industries can be highly complex and requires particular know-how 
the local government might not have), its economy has acquired capabilities to run the 
industry, the host country’s economy does not depend significantly on exports controlled 
by foreign firms, and political competition is restricted.27 Movements of international 
commodity prices can also account for industry-specific expropriations, for example, the 
link between high oil prices and oil company expropriations. This dynamic is frequently 
most evident in more autocratic host countries, combining a range of different reasons to 
account for these events.28  
 In summary, existing explanations cover a wide range of reasons for 
expropriations, but even these do not fully explain all cases of expropriation. We 
maintain that closer attention to the specific national contexts and the convergence of 
domestic interest groups are important, yet undertheorized in terms of how expropriations 
occur. Our comparative historiography offers an alternative framework that is more 
responsive to the kind of contextual, contingent, and temporally unique features of 
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expropriations in developing countries. We believe that historical research’s strengths in 
attending to the specific and unique in the analysis of historical events offers an 
alternative mode to creating theoretically relevant explanations.  
 
Selecting cases of expropriation in Latin America and sub-Saharan Africa 
 
Our synthesis focuses on historical research on expropriations in developing countries in 
the mid-twentieth century, a period that saw a large number of expropriations. 
Expropriation is defined as a “governmental action to transfer the ownership of private 
(in this case, foreign) assets to the state, with or without compensation”29 or “the forced 
divestment of equity ownership of a foreign direct investor.”30 We consider cases in 
which the government forces the divestment of foreign-owned assets either to redistribute 
them among a particular domestic constituency (referred to as indigenization) or to be 
owned by the government (nationalization).  In this study, we do not consider cases of 
“creeping expropriation” defined as cases “when governments change taxes, regulation, 
access, and laws to reduce the profitability of foreign investment.”31  We also distinguish 
between nationalization and indigenization as two different forms of expropriation that 
are usually lumped together.32  
 For this article, we chose to discuss several paradigmatic cases of expropriation.  
The one taking place in Mexico in 1938 was the largest one at that time outside the 
Communist world. Venezuela was a major oil producer in the 1970s and has previously 
led the creation of OPEC. The conflicts between the Chilean government and foreign 
firms eventually led to the establishment of one of the longest military dictatorships in the 
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Americas. Ghana and Nigeria were the two most extensive cases of indigenization 
degrees. Zambia’s copper nationalization was seen as a response to the Chilean decrees, 
and Tanzania’s nationalizations in response to the Arusha declaration was one of the few 
cases in Africa that were influenced by political ideology.  
While nationalization means that the government expropriates and takes over 
shares and assets, in the case of indigenization the government enacts legislation that 
requires foreign investors to sell part or all their shares or assets to a domestic owner. 
This was an important factor in our selection of cases, as we were interested in why 
governments would choose one form of expropriation over another. Indigenization-type 
expropriation was more common in sub-Saharan Africa, so we selected two well-known 
and significant cases (Ghana and Nigeria) to compare them to well-known and significant 
cases in Latin America (Mexico, Chile, and Venezuela). However, sub-Saharan Africa 
also had well-known cases of nationalization, so we added Zambia and Tanzania for 
further comparison. We were not aware of any significant cases of indigenization in Latin 
America. All of these cases saw significant expropriations, by which we mean the size 
and scale of expropriations of foreign property were considered sizeable at the time.33 
They also suggest having categories that differ on key dimensions, which for our cases 
are geography and type of expropriation (see figure 1).  Finally, we also considered 
whether there had been historical research on these cases for us to synthesize. 
 




We searched for literature on our cases based on prior knowledge, general 
historical accounts, hand-searching, and following up references. Historical research on 
our theme was rarely in the form of a standalone study or monograph solely dedicated to 
the subject, but rather formed part of other research controversies or a holistic account of 
a historical period. As a result, the terminology used by authors varied, making it difficult 
to conduct focused systematic searches through standard software tools. Ultimately, we 
selected studies that were either historical narratives based on archival sources34 or by 
now historical accounts by social scientists at the time.35 While most historiographical 
accounts follow established research controversies, our comparative historical analysis of 
our cases showed relatively little overarching debate or cross-citation. We compiled 
preliminary case histories for our seven cases, focusing on domestic political processes 
and actors in their explanations. We then compared within and across cases to develop 
analytically structured histories for comparison.36  
 
Expropriations of Foreign Property in Latin America and Sub-Saharan 
Africa 
 
Expropriations in the twentieth century took place in two waves and mostly occurred in 
developing countries.37 During the 1920s and 1930s, the most important events of the 
first wave took place in Latin America and Eastern Europe.38 During World War II, the 
United States and their allies expropriated German property in their territories and, 
shortly after the end of the war, Soviet-occupied territories also expropriated both 
domestic and foreign property as part of their agenda of eliminating private property. 
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During the early 1960s (the first years of the second wave), most expropriations took 
place in Asia, but from 1967 onward, the great majority of expropriations took place in 
Africa and Latin America (see Figure 2).39   
 
Figure 2 about here 
 
From our comparison between our seven cases, it became clear that different domestic 
groups supported nationalization or indigenization legislation. For the Latin American 
cases, the role of the labor movement stood out, but this was not the case in the sub-
Saharan African countries. These also showed a marked difference in terms of the type of 
expropriation: indigenization decrees in West Africa were broadly supported by a more 
or less organized domestic business community, whereas nationalizations in East Africa 
appeared to be driven by different groups within the government or the ruling party. We 
structure our historical narrative to reflect these insights. 
 
Government Alliances with Organized Labor 
 
The labor movement has played a significant and active role in governments’ decision to 
expropriate foreign-owned property in several countries. If the government’s alliance 
included the labor force working for the foreign firms and the workforce was sufficiently 
organized, the government responded to conflicts between labor and multinationals by 
supporting domestic workers, and not the foreign investor.  These political alliances can 
shift over time, and policies towards foreign firms change accordingly. We find clear 
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examples illustrating these changes in the case of the Mexican and Venezuelan oil 
industries and the Chilean copper industry. 
The Mexican oil history constitutes a classic example of an expropriation 
resulting from changes in the government’s political alliance. General Porfirio Díaz ruled 
Mexico from 1876 to 1910. Díaz brought stability to the country after decades of political 
chaos, internal and external wars by ruling with an iron fist while simultaneously opening 
the doors to foreign investors. Díaz’s rule perfectly exemplified a regime supported by a 
small political alliance.  He restricted political freedoms and created a system in which 
most economic rents were distributed among those belonging to his inner political circle:  
“Díaz realized that to co-opt potential opponents he needed to reward them with rents.  
He also realized that to generate those rents; he needed to promote investment. Promoting 
investment required that Díaz specify and enforce property rights as private, not public 
goods.”40 Díaz achieved this through two means: by passing legislation that was very 
favorable to foreign oil companies and by creating a larger system in which the regional 
elites benefited from the operations of foreign corporations.  The British oil firm Pearson 
and Son exemplifies how the system worked, as its board featured the most influential 
individuals in Mexico, including Díaz’s son.41  During his rule, Díaz oversaw legislation 
that favored the operations of foreign corporations, including those operating in the oil 
sector. In short, the Díaz alliance included the foreign investors and segments of the 
national elite and excluded other groups of the Mexican society. 
Events after 1910 suggest that the government’s winning alliance was changing 
concerning the political system created by Díaz. Frustrated at what they considered to be 
a policy that only benefited a small circle of Díaz’s friends, members of the Mexican elite 
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overthrew Díaz.  This action led to the widespread uprising known as the Mexican 
Revolution.  In 1915, amid a civil war, a revolutionary faction led by Venustiano 
Carranza took power in Mexico City and launched a process to change the country’s 
institutional framework.  His government was responsible for the 1917 Constitution that 
granted the government legal rights over the country’s subsoil and for increased taxation 
of the oil multinationals, precisely when oil prices were rising sharply.42  Even though 
this stopped short of expropriation, the multinationals considered these actions as 
confiscatory and the US and British governments condemned the new legislation. These 
reactions clearly show that the alliance with foreign investors had been broken and 
Carranza sought a new alliance with the domestic business elite. The Constitution, 
however, remained unchanged. In 1920 Carranza was overthrown by one of his generals, 
Alvaro Obregón, who immediately faced strong resistance from some of the other 
members of the military who remained loyal to Carranza. Obregón responded by creating 
an alliance with peasants and labor unions.  Under Obregón’s rule, a powerful labor 
federation was created (the CROM), which became crucial to ensuring his political 
survival.43 Despite his approach to the labor unions, Obregón promised the United States 
that he would refrain from taking measures against US oil companies in exchange for the 
neighboring country’s official recognition as Mexico’s legitimate president (a necessary 
gesture, as the civil war had not yet concluded).  Tensions with the United States rose 
once again under Obregón’s successor between 1924 and 1934, as the government 
increasingly demanded greater concessions from the multinationals, again stopping short 
of expropriation.  During this period, the productivity of the Mexican oil industry began 
to decrease, and the oil firms gradually started moving to the more productive oilfields of 
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Venezuela, which was politically more accommodating to foreign investors.44  Mexico’s 
rulers increased the size of their political alliance by approaching the national industrial 
elite while remaining allied to the coopted labor unions. So, the government was building 
an alliance with domestic business owners, but not to have it as a support for 
expropriation. 
In 1934, Mexico elected Lázaro Cárdenas as president. It is in this phase that the 
shifting political alliances became favorable to expropriation. Cárdenas took power at a 
moment in which the country had finally achieved political stability and wanted to 
consolidate his party’s power by strengthening its ties with the labor movement.  In 1938, 
oil workers went on strike demanding higher wages.  The multinationals refused, and the 
unions took the case to the Mexican Supreme Court, which ruled in favor of the unions.  
When the multinationals refused to comply, Cárdenas decreed the complete 
nationalization of foreign oil property in Mexico. Taking control of the expropriated 
assets, the government created a state monopoly (PEMEX), which became an important 
base of support for Cárdenas’ government. 
Changes in the size and composition of the Venezuelan government’s winning 
alliance also played a role in the nationalization of its oil industry in 1976. Contrary to 
the Mexican case, however, this initiative did not come from a left-wing party and did not 
face opposition from the US government.  Oil multinationals arrived in Venezuela in the 
1920s during the dictatorship of Juan Vicente Gómez (1908-1935).  Gómez repressed 
labor unionism and opposition parties while creating a favorable business environment 
for foreign oil firms. This meant that Gómez built a clear alliance with foreign direct 
investors. In 1918 he even invited the multinationals to write the oil legislation 
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themselves.  Gómez created a concession system under which many domestic landowners 
applied for concessions and then sold them to foreign firms, making handsome profits in 
the process.  These individuals and families, together with the multinationals and 
members of the army, became Gómez’s political alliance and, during his rule, he 
accordingly managed the country’s economic policy to their benefit.  Gómez died in 1935 
while still in power. 
Following Gómez’s death, Venezuela was ruled by military dictatorships until 
1959 (with a brief pause when the center-left Acción Democrática Party, or AD, ruled 
between 1947 and 1948). During these years, the policy towards foreign oil firms 
consisted mostly of increasing taxes.  The banned pro-democracy opposition argued that 
the resulting higher government income was used mostly to reward those close to the 
dictators. Venezuela returned to civilian rule in 1959 under an AD that shifted its original 
left-wing position to the center by increasing the budget for the military, promising to 
respect the property rights of the landowning elites, decreasing taxation, and slowing 
social reforms. Starting that year, Venezuela approved a series of laws that increased 
government participation in oil profits (forced partial nationalization) and limited the 
arrival of new foreign firms.45 Social programs were funded by the taxes paid by foreign 
firms rather than the domestic private sector.46 This shows that the previous alliance 
between the government and foreign investors was gradually breaking.  
The main opposition party was the center-right COPEI (the Comité de 
Organización Política Electoral Independiente, also known as the Social Christian Party).  
After winning the presidential election in 1969 despite its right-wing leanings, the COPEI 
leadership also demonstrated openness to the idea of nationalizing the oil industry. By 
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this time, Venezuela had a sizable middle class with the necessary technical skills to run 
the industry, a sophisticated industrial elite, and a stable democratic regime, meeting 
several of the preconditions for a government to be capable of expropriating and running 
a company or sector, as pointed out by Kobrin.47 In 1970, the center-right COPEI 
nationalized the gas industry and announced complete government ownership of oil fields 
by 1983.  This action showed that COPEI could not build a powerful enough political 
alliance for the 1974 elections without a nationalist platform.  AD, however, still took 
power in 1974, but by that time, both parties agreed on the idea of domestic ownership of 
the oil industry, especially at a time when oil prices were rising sharply.48 This step was 
taken in January 1976, when an AD Venezuelan government took control of the domestic 
oil industry and created the state-owned enterprise Petróleos de Venezuela (PDVSA), 
turning foreign multinationals already present into contractors. Between 1977 and 1999, 
PDVSA played an important part in generating employment for the AD’s base while the 
AD also controlled the firm’s union, which had the power to mobilize voters in their 
favor.49  
Other expropriations were initiated by center or center-right regimes that had the 
support of a relatively large alliance composed of middle and working-class supporters. 
In 1964, Christian Democrat Eduardo Frei was elected as president of Chile and his 
constituency was composed of the middle class and some sectors of the working class 
distrustful of the left.  Frei’s political platform included increases in welfare spending, 
protectionism, and the nationalization of the foreign-dominated copper and 
telecommunications industries, which were both in the hands of American multinationals: 
Anaconda, Kennecott and Cerro Corporation for the copper industry and the International 
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Telephone and Telegraph (ITT) for telecommunications. Frei opted for a policy he called 
the “Chileanization” (partial nationalization) of the copper industry which aimed to 
increase domestic ownership to 51 percent after negotiations with the multinational 
Anaconda. This policy was developed in a context in which rising copper prices 
throughout the 1960s boosted revenues in that sector. 
Additionally, as was the case for Venezuela in the 1960s, by this time, Chile had 
developed its domestic capabilities to exploit this sector.50  Frei also created a state-
owned telecommunications firm to compete with ITT. These initiatives were widely 
supported by the middle and working-class public and faced little opposition in 
Parliament.51  In 1970, Marxist Salvador Allende won the presidential election supported 
by a broad alliance composed of left-wing peasant and industrial labor unions, an 
important segment of the urban shantytowns’ population, also attracting some middle-
class supporters. Despite Allende’s ideological differences with his centrist predecessor 
Frei, economic nationalist policies continued to have strong popular support. Allende’s 
anti-imperialistic and Marxist discourse made expropriation consistent with his ideology. 
In 1971, Allende declared the expropriation of the properties of Anaconda, Kennecott and 
Cerro to create the state-owned enterprise CODELCO, a few years before significant 
increases in copper prices.  Later, in 1972, he expropriated ITT after discovering that the 
firm was involved in a scheme to overthrow him.  It is worth highlighting that, despite the 
fierce opposition Allende faced from the Chilean center and right-wing parties, these two 
initiatives passed smoothly in the Chilean parliament.52 Resource nationalism permitted 
Allende to have a wider agenda regarding expropriation in this particular industry than 
the one he could count on for other policies.   
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The examples in this section discuss cases of countries that undergo social, 
economic, and political transformations. This leads to a change from a regime supported 
by a small elite alliance that included the foreign investors to one that relies on a wider 
political alliance that includes the middle and lower classes (the latter usually 
participating in politics through powerful labor unions). To reward the members of their 
political alliance and ensure their loyalty, governments of both left-leaning and center-
right leaning orientation often took over the properties of foreign firms to establish job-
creating state-owned enterprises and invest in areas of interest for their political 
alliance.53 All these initiatives were supported by rhetoric that fused economic 
independence and national sovereignty.  Although an alliance with organized labor was 
an important factor, in making these expropriations possible, they did not necessarily 
translate into an increase of the welfare in general.  Throughout the decades following the 
expropriations, the labor unions of both PDVSA and PEMEX were notorious for their 
corruption. In the Chilean case, the copper industry continued to be one of the main 
sources of income for the military, so it was not re-privatized.   
 
Government Alliances With Domestic Business Sector 
 
Even though one would assume that the domestic private sector should oppose 
expropriation of foreign property on the grounds that domestic firms would see this 
action as a threat to their property rights, several scholars argue that a government can 
selectively protect property rights –ensuring that the property of a particular group will 
not be subject to expropriation.54  This is most likely where domestic business has 
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significant political influence. When a government’s main constituency is composed of 
domestic businesspeople in societies that offer limited political participation for the wider 
population, a government might either increase taxation on foreign firms or expropriate 
foreign property to redistribute rents among a segment of the private sector.  Two West 
African cases highlight how expropriation via indigenization decrees aimed to legitimize 
the postcolonial national identity and citizenship.55 
The policies followed by the government of Ghana after independence in 1957 
highlight the role of the domestic business community in the expropriation of foreign 
property.  Ghana, the first British Sub-Saharan colony to gain independence, began 
expropriations after its first head of state (Kwame Nkrumah) was overthrown in 1966 by 
an alliance of pro-Western police and military men.  As a result of this turbulent political 
history, the expropriation programs fall into two distinct periods: an early phase from 
1968 to 1969 and a later phase from 1972 to 1977. The “caretaker” regime that overthrew 
Nkrumah in 1966 returned the country to a short-lived democracy in 1969, which ended 
in 1972 after General Ignatius Acheampong and the military overthrew the government. 
In terms of the expropriation programs, the earlier decrees were minor and focused on 
resident foreigners, such as the Lebanese community. These were not foreign investors as 
understood in international business scholarship. The targeted groups were, rather, 
domestic investors with foreign nationalities. The fact that these groups were frequently 
the most affected by indigenization legislation suggests that these forms of expropriations 
were closely intertwined with contemporary struggles over citizenship in postcolonial 
Africa.56  Major beneficiaries of the indigenization legislation were small African 
businesses, which had felt threatened by the competition.57  
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A somewhat different pattern emerges from Ghanaian expropriations after 1972, 
both regarding the motivations behind these policies as well as the firms that they 
targeted. In 1972, the partial nationalization of privately-owned gold mines was 
announced; compensation for the 55 percent stake was negotiated by 1974. In other 
sectors, the government opted for indigenization instead of nationalization, which 
amounted to the forced sale of foreign business to domestic citizens, rather than the 
government. Similar to the indigenization decree of the late 1960s, this measure mostly 
targeted companies owned by resident Lebanese traders. Politically significant groups 
such as small shopkeepers and market traders supported these decrees. But the 1970s 
program went further and also legislated the partial indigenization of large, Western-
owned businesses.58 The main beneficiaries were relatively wealthy investors, as well as 
skilled employees and Ghanaian managers, who gained access both to lucrative 
investment and better positions in foreign companies. As this was mostly achieved 
through the sale of shares, foreign investors remained the main shareholders. Targeted 
nationalization, as in the case of gold mining, aimed to more strategically expand 
government control over the main sources of foreign exchange income.  
The most consistent pressure, however, was applied to companies regarding their 
employment practices, suggesting a desire to open up more opportunities to better-
educated members of the middle class, who left the country in large numbers in the 1970s 
to find a better life abroad, given the declining economy and the repressive political 
regime. Expatriate immigration quotas had been in place since the days of Nkrumah’s 
rule (1957-1966), but they became increasingly restrictive. Foreign firms were now at 
pains to show that they hired, trained, and promoted Ghanaians into responsible 
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positions.59 This suggests an attempt on the part of the military government to gain the 
support of a relatively broad section of the population: predominantly urban, the alliance 
included groups such as uneducated owners of small shops, owners of medium-sized 
enterprises, well-educated, salaried or professional middle classes and relatively wealthy 
investors. Organized labor was noticeably absent here, even though it played a more 
significant part in the Latin American cases. In post-colonial Africa, trade unions had 
become dominated by political parties and only rarely found an independent voice or had 
the power to influence politics.60 
The Nigerian expropriations of the 1970s share some similarities with those of 
Ghana but in a context of greater political instability and booming oil prices. After the 
country became independent in 1960, it adopted a federal democratic system, plagued 
from the outset by regional rivalries and political tensions. The discovery of major oil and 
petroleum deposits in the Niger Delta in the late 1960s influenced the political landscape 
of the independent country, and, in what came to be known as the “resource curse,” 
further undermined effective governance.61 In 1966, Nigeria’s government was 
overthrown in a military coup, and ethnic tensions between the different regions led to 
the secession of Eastern Nigeria under the name of Biafra. The ensuing civil war lasted 
from 1967 to 1970, and the control of the oil-producing areas in the Niger Delta was key 
to the conflict. The willingness of international oil producers to collaborate with the 
Biafrans undermined their legitimacy in the eyes of the Nigerian government. 
At the end of the Nigerian civil war, the government partly nationalized the three 
largest commercial banks, which were all foreign-owned. This was a strategic decision to 
ensure access to finance for the subsequent indigenization decrees. In 1972, the first 
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Nigerian Enterprise Promotion Decree (NEPD 1) favored domestic business owners 
similar to indigenization in Ghana, but targeted not just small to medium-sized 
companies but also larger international ones. The government negotiated separately with 
the oil companies over partial expropriations.62 In 1975, Olusegun Obasanjo took over 
the military government and his administration were critical of what NEPD 1 had 
achieved so far. NEPD 2 was announced in 1977 and aimed to be far more 
comprehensive than its predecessor. However, its implementation coincided with a slump 
in oil prices and general turmoil in the international economy, as several developing 
countries faced a debt crisis. In 1981, the Nigerian government reclassified several 
industries to attract foreign investment, effectively reversing many of the decisions of 
NEPD 2.63 Falling oil prices curbed the political and economic gains that could be 
realized from expropriating existing foreign investment and increasingly limited the 
inflow of new international investment.64 However, while prices fell from their peak in 
1980, they never dropped below the already high level reached in 1973.  
The NEPDs was shaped partly by the demands of Nigerian businesspeople, who 
effectively lobbied the government, especially for NEPD 1.65  Local business owners 
stood to gain the most from expropriating Lebanese and Western small to medium-sized 
enterprises, and from being able to gain a stake in major Western multinationals.66 
Subsequently, public criticisms of NEPD 1 focused on redistributive issues, especially 
the highly oversubscribed public issues that led to the concentration of wealth in the 
hands of a few already affluent individuals and families, with around twenty individuals 
or family groups taking up the majority of the shares according to some estimates.67 
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NEPD 2 showed greater control by the state bureaucracy but was too short-lived to 
achieve its aims fully. 
These two cases evidence some of the conditions under which the domestic 
private sector of a country can choose to support the expropriation of foreign private 
property.  In both cases, domestic businesspeople lobbied military governments in the 
name of economic decolonization and better domestic development.68  Even though some 
sub-Saharan rulers gravitated towards the Soviet Union during the Cold War, this was not 
the case for Nigeria or Ghana after Nkrumah. Expropriations in these countries did not 
necessarily amount to hostility towards the private sector, they were, rather, a form of 
economic nationalism and were driven by domestic political concerns and volatile 
commodity prices, rather than ideological commitments. In countries where self-
employment was more common than unionized employment, small domestic businesses 
sought government support against foreign competitors. The better-educated middle 
classes wanted improved employment opportunities by lobbying for reducing the number 
of expatriates holding senior posts. This created a political constituency in favor of 
expropriating foreign investors. However, these groups preferred indigenization over 
nationalization, which offered direct benefit in terms of investment and employment. 
 
Government Alliance With State Bureaucracy 
 
While indigenization was a common form of expropriation in West Africa, East 
African countries were more likely to opt for nationalization. We assume that the 
governments of host countries do not necessarily act as a homogenous entity, and 
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consider instead how they are subjected to power struggles between different interest 
groups.  In African countries, many of which were one-party states, intra-party 
competition was of particular relevance. In this section, we examine cases in which the 
expropriation of foreign property was a measure through which a government sought to 
maintain the support of party members or senior administrators.  The history of 
expropriations in Tanzania and Zambia are instructive here because both countries 
experimented with different types of “African socialism” and both had stable and long-
term autocratic regimes. 
Tanzania’s long-term ruler Julius Nyerere (1961-1985) provides a case in which a 
government undertook the most comprehensive attempt to convert “African Socialism” 
into reality through a national scheme of village collectivization known as Ujamaa, 
which initially aimed to redistribute assets and services to small-scale collectives.69  
Nyerere announced the Arusha Declaration in 1967 because he had grown concerned at 
the power wielded by members of his party and the wider government bureaucracy. As 
party members were unsurprisingly not enthused by a program partly designed to curb 
their influence and control over resources, Nyerere sought to gain their support when he 
“announced a series of nationalizations that were guaranteed to garner public 
sympathy.”70 These policies played well with a long-standing anti-foreign undercurrent 
within the party, as they most affected resident ethnic Asian and European 
businesspeople, similarly to the targeting of Lebanese businesspeople in West Africa. 
Here, public enthusiasm was employed as a kind of “psychic gain” to camouflage other 
less popular measures, as argued by Albert Breton for the Canadian case.71  
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The political alliance driving these policies was different from both the 
nationalizations in Latin America and the West African cases of expropriation. Neither 
labor nor domestic business was economically or politically strong enough to drive major 
changes in economic policies. Power was centralized in the one-party state, i.e., 
Tanganyika African National Union (TANU) and the government administration. Civil 
servants had been prevented by colonial rules to join TANU and were generally better 
educated, Western-oriented, and focused on technocratic solutions to improve economic 
growth. TANU officials excelled through their political commitment to a left-leaning 
party, favored redistributive economic policies, and lacked the skills and expertise to 
exercise effective control of the civil service.72 Support for nationalization came mainly 
from party officials, while civil servants were concerned about capital flight and a 
reduction in tax revenue.  
Tanzania was heavily agricultural, lacked substantial industries and opportunities 
for continued economic development were constrained without foreign capital, which 
dominated the economy. This was particularly obvious in finance and banking, and also 
industrial production. When the nationalization of the banks and insurance were 
announced, most of their finance was invested in London, out of reach of the Tanzanian 
government. After the Arusha declaration, the state took over the banks, the National 
Insurance Corporation, flour-milling firms, as well as controlling interests in seven 
industries, sisal production, and trading companies.73 While the banks and other firms 
were in a relatively strong bargaining position as they had relatively less capital in 
Tanzania at the time of nationalization, nationalizations remained popular with party 
leaders. They continued to press for more expropriations, and in 1970 Nyerere announced 
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the nationalization of wholesale trade and private import-export firms, mostly controlled 
by Asians. This follows a familiar pattern to West African indigenization programs 
targeting Lebanese to a significant extent. In 1976, “Operation Maduka” extended this to 
retail in Tanzania, seeking to replace small Asian-owned retail shops and replacing them 
with co-operatives.74 
These policies were popular because they opened up employment opportunities in 
the commercial sector, as well as facilitating rapid promotion to management positions in 
the subsidiaries of international companies such as the banks.75 The political importance 
of Africanization in Tanzania is shown by Nyerere’s 1964 attempt to abolish it on the 
grounds of racial discrimination. The army responded by an abortive military coup, 
which strengthened the hands of party officials who successfully pressed for the Arusha 
declaration of 1967.76  While socialist ideology in the form of “controlling the heights of 
the economy” and self-reliant national economic development became institutionalized 
from the late 1960s onwards, Tanzanian nationalization reflected domestic political 
alliances not necessarily based on socialist ideology. Party officials sought the support of 
the electorate by opening up employment opportunities through nationalization, whereas 
civil servants’ interests were, in general, aligned with foreign investors as they sought the 
capital for development initiatives.  
By the late 1970s, economic crisis engulfed Tanzania: between 1978 and 1985, 
manufacturing declined from 13.5 to 6.9 percent of the GDP, which also shrank in that 
period. While the country maintained democratic elections throughout that time, the 
elected parliament was fairly powerless, as a small alliance of bureaucrats and party 
members retained significant influence.77 Although Nyerere’s approach to nationalization 
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was populist and aimed at gaining the support of a larger alliance within his party and 
beyond, it ultimately mostly benefitted a narrow alliance of mainly party members and 
some civil servants, who directly controlled the assets of foreign firms.78  
The Zambian expropriations highlight a similar strategy of seeking to ensure the 
continued support of different groups of government officials during the tenure of 
Kenneth Kaunda, who led the United National Independence Party, UNIP (1964-1991). 
The nationalizations of the copper mining companies in Zambia received a significant 
amount of attention in the general media and scholarly literature (similarly to the 
nationalization of copper mining in Chile).79 Zambia’s economy and government were 
highly dependent on the performance of this notoriously cyclical industry.80 Although 
other privately owned companies operating in Zambia, many were either resident 
expatriate or foreign-owned and were significantly smaller than the copper companies. 
Zambian-owned enterprises were limited, as they had been restricted from trading during 
the colonial period. The National Wholesale and Marketing Company was in part a 
vehicle to support the expansion of private Zambian business, but progress was perceived 
as too slow.81 As part of the government’s decision to “localize” the economy, in 1968 
and 1969 Kaunda requested partial nationalization of foreign firms in return for adequate 
compensation. At the same time, several parastatal organizations (state-owned 
enterprises) were created to oversee the performance of the public-private joint ventures, 
in line with ideas of African socialism. These parastatals wielded significant political 
influence, led by Zambians such as Andrew Sardanis at INDECO. Even though they were 
not technically part of the administration, they were effectively controlled by the 
government.82 Parastatals were staffed by well-educated, younger professionals, often 
30 
 
referred to as “technocrats” for whom there were no obvious openings in the civil service 
and the party ranks, and who were paid higher salaries in the parastatals than could be 
achieved in the regular civil service.83  
With a surprise announcement in 1973, the Zambian government fully 
nationalized the two copper mining joint ventures ahead of significant increases in copper 
prices. But even more significantly for their domestic alliances, they placed the 
supervision of mining under two ministries, thus reassigning a function that was 
previously performed by a parastatal. Civil servants asserted control over nationalized 
companies, at the expense of the technocrats leading parastatals. While organized labor 
was a significant constituency in the Copperbelt, the union remained relatively 
unpolitical, and strikes were banned by the Zambian government in this period. More 
significant were divergent interests within the state that crystallized around three groups: 
politicians, civil servants, and technocrats. Similar to Tanzania, the politicians were less 
well educated than the civil servants and the technocrats, while the civil servants were 
established in top ministerial posts. As the pace of promotion slowed down with the near 
completion of the Africanization process from which the civil servants had benefitted, the 
relatively younger group of technocrats had fewer opportunities.84  Nationalization 
opened up well-paid positions in the parastatals for technocrats and some entrepreneurs, 
which created conflict with less well-paid civil servants. Earlier nationalizations also 
increased the influence of technocrats like Sardanis, leading to conflict with politicians 
and civil servants. The technocrats had dominated the earlier partial nationalization, 
while the later expropriations were prompted by further internal political divisions within 
the government.85 Similarly to the nationalizations in Tanzania, the Zambian 
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nationalizations were driven by quite a narrow constituency within the public sector that, 
despite its limited scope, experienced internal competition between different groups of 
party members and civil servants, most notably the younger generation of technocrats and 
the civil servants in charge of ministries.  
 
A new framework for understanding expropriation 
 
Business historians have studied economic nationalism, expropriations, and their impact 
on companies extensively.86 However, many other disciplines have been more influential 
in putting forward general explanations of why countries would seek to expropriate, 
which we review in the next section.87 This is partly because the research questions that 
business historians have asked differ significantly from those in international business or 
political economy. Historians have been more interested in why some governments 
expropriate while others do not under similar circumstances, how they choose to 
implement expropriation, and who ultimately benefits from expropriations. It is 
nevertheless more difficult to generalize from a diverse set of individual in-depth case 
studies that span different continents and periods, and this has limited the influence of 
historical research on the wider debate. This is why we believe that a more 
historiographical approach that synthesizes existing historical research has the potential 
to offer new insights to historical as well as interdisciplinary researchers.  
Historiography summarizes historical controversies that often focus on similar 
research questions, or the same historical event, period, or topic. This is not the case for 
historical research on expropriations, which often asks different research questions while 
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focusing on different countries and periods. Hence, we engaged with debates on 
comparative historiography, but focus on how narrative synthesis can be useful to 
business history in generating frameworks to understand and compare in-depth historical 
cases. The necessity to draw on the existing historical research more synthetically was 
already recognized in the 1950s and gained greater traction in the 1980s as comparative 
history.88 More recently, the notion of comparative historiography has come to the fore 
again, but mostly as comparative work on the nature of historical writing in different 
cultures, rather than the more empirical approach which we develop here.89  
 In our synthesis, we first focus on the role of economic nationalism in establishing 
the historical legitimacy of the nation-state. Historians maintain that the legitimacy of a 
nation-state is built on a series of widely accepted myths around the country’s creation 
and general characteristics often promoted from above through “conscious and deliberate 
ideological engineering.”90 National movements often gained independence from their 
former colonial metropoles without military conflict when they formed “newly 
emancipated states claiming a national identity which they did not possess.”91 Defining a 
national identity within new territorial borders inhabited by diverse cultural and ethnic 
groups posed distinct challenges. Elites in “peripheral countries” (meaning those not 
belonging to Western Europe, United States and other areas of the rich world) face the 
problem of trying to generate national pride in countries that are poor and subordinated to 
the world powers.  
One way in which those elites dealt with this challenge consisted of in promoting 
unity and a sense of belonging to a nation-state by romanticizing their country’s 
peripheral status and promoting a sentiment of pride around the perceived necessity of 
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“resistance” against exploitative imperialism.92  Persistent poverty means that peripheral 
elites struggled to generate national pride around non-material issues.  Therefore, 
developing countries whose economies were dominated by the export of one or two 
natural resources created a sense of national belonging around narratives in which those 
exports represented the promise of future economic development and stability.93  
Countries with these characteristics often developed nationalism around a sense of 
collective ownership of a natural resource, or other economic activities considered a 
feature of national identity.94 
The population of a peripheral country can make common cause around the 
defense of domestic control or ownership of their export products or main economic 
activity.  For instance, from the 1960s to the 2000s, different Latin American 
governments used the same slogan when expropriating foreign oil: “the oil is ours.”95 In a 
discussion of Canadian economic nationalism, Breton argued that this populist rhetoric 
resulted in an intangible “psychic gain.”96 Our analysis of the expropriation of foreign 
property engages with these theoretical approaches to peripheral economies by taking 
into consideration both the challenges of building a nation-state in the twentieth century 
as well as the mobilization of the population around the fate of an export product or key 
economic sector under foreign control.    
Thus the longevity of the nation-state is a crucial element to understand 
expropriations of foreign private property. Nation-states had already consolidated when 
major expropriations took place in Latin America, whereas in Sub-Saharan Africa, they 
had not. Latin American nation-states emerged between the 1820s and the 1870s. During 
this period, most Latin American countries went from being part of the Spanish Empire 
34 
 
to having their national borders defined in a way that does not differ much from those we 
find in the early twenty-first century. This means that by the early twentieth century, most 
Latin American states had developed some administrative capacity and no longer faced 
contestations regarding who belonged to the national community and had citizen’s rights. 
By the early twentieth century, few Latin Americans challenged the idea that their 
national identity included European elements such as the Spanish and Portuguese 
languages or the Catholic faith.  Most post-1920s social conflicts in Latin America were 
defined by class struggles rather than by national identity, with the labor movement 
playing an increasingly important role in the evolution of political parties.97   
 In sub-Saharan Africa, expropriations took place after the 1960s, when those 
countries were experiencing a process of postcolonial state-formation with the attendant 
need to legitimize these new political units. During this period, these countries were still 
defining what it meant to be a national citizen and, in determining this status, granted 
increased importance to ethnic origin over the place of birth or residence.98 Most African 
states emerged out of colonial administrative units, which reflected international 
diplomacy and a pattern of exploration and subjugation that bore little similarity with pre-
existing political, ethnic, or social divisions.99 There were few cases of territorial states in 
Africa before colonial expansion in the nineteenth century. Thus, the colonial languages 
were frequently the only languages spoken jointly, although in East Africa Kiswahili was 
significant, and elsewhere European languages were localized as Krio/Creole and Pidgin. 
The majority of former British, Belgian, and French colonies gained independence in the 
1960s, for the most part in a relatively orderly process of constitutional devolution.100 
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African nationalists were frequently co-opted by colonial administrations during 
decolonization (with some important exceptions).101   
 
Insert Table 2 about here 
 
The features of expropriation policies in sub-Saharan Africa should be viewed in 
this context (for a summary, see Table 2). Expropriation policies did not just reflect 
attempts on the part of governments to create political alliances; they also aimed to 
enhance the fundamental institutional legitimacy of the state itself.102 The state needed to 
provide opportunities and income to its most important constituencies, especially the 
urban and educated population. 
 A second significant element defining the composition of the alliances is the 
strength of labor unions. By the 1920s and 1930s, labor unions in many Latin American 
countries played an important political role and employed nationalist rhetoric.  
Conversely, labor unions did not play a significant role in most sub-Saharan African 
countries after independence. Unions and independent African governments had an often 
complicated relationship (in some cases, like in Zambia, this was because white workers 
dominated the unions).103  In other cases, young professionals working for foreign firms 
did not always see unions as the best means of advancing within these firms, especially as 
the unions were either fractured or controlled by the ruling party and thus deeply 
politicized.104 
 A final factor is the presence of a sizeable number of domestic business people 
with effective political representation. In the West African cases, the political influence 
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of small urban market traders was comparable to that of the labor unions in Latin 
America, but of a different nature. Moreover, politically influential elite families also 
sought to protect or extend their business interests. For the East African cases, these 
groups were relatively weak and politically marginalized. In most Latin American 
countries, domestic business owners were closely associated with the government, but 
during periods of populist rule, they were on the defensive.105  As we show below, 
however, they could, on occasion, be part of a political alliance against foreign capital if 
they perceived that economic benefits could ensue from that action.   
  We explain how governments in Latin America and sub-Saharan Africa sought 
the support of different groups of political supporters by drawing on selectorate theory, 
which focuses on the mechanisms of political survival.106 This theory assumes that all 
types of governments (whether they are elected officials or dictators) will need to respond 
to a specific constituency.107 Even the most openly dictatorial regimes are aware of the 
need to secure the loyalty of a mass of people to whom they offer economic benefits and 
not simply out of fear.108 Similarly, elected officials seeking to secure their re-election or 
that of their political party may engage in the political game to ensure the loyalty of this 
alliance that will mobilize voters to the polls. Thus, these scholars maintain that the main 
goal of economic policy (in either authoritarian regimes or pluralistic ones) is to ensure 
the political survival of those in power (either an individual, a military junta, or a political 
party).  This means that, when necessary, a country’s rulers will follow economic policies 
that ensure the loyalty of their alliance even if those policies go against their official 
ideology or do not translate into more growth or efficiency.109 We refer to this as 
“political alliance.” If the rulers’ survival depends on a relatively small political alliance 
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(say a few generals, some families, or a particular ethnic group), they will develop 
economic policies that particularly benefit the members of that group.  Conversely, if 
government’s survival depends on a large-scale political alliance (e.g., voters of a 
particular party, large labor unions, a large revolutionary army, or even a large ethnic 
group), economic policy would seek to distribute economic rents among that large 
number of members that make up this political alliance. 
 From our comparative case histories, we conclude that the interplay between these 
two factors – nationalism and political alliances – determined decisions to expropriate, 
often in conjunction with the movement of international prices for commodities 
controlled by expropriated firms. When general conditions were favorable for 
expropriation, it became attractive for governments in developing countries to gain 
political support through economic nationalism. While many countries expropriated 
foreign investors in the middle of the twentieth century, by no means, all developing 
countries did so. Economic nationalism became an important factor if the longevity and 
legitimacy of the nation-state were key political issues that would mobilize political 
support. For West Africa, Collins and Biersteker, for example, highlighted that domestic 
redistribution struggles drove expropriations.110 Wilson argued that country studies alone 
did not reflect how nationalization and indigenization in Africa were driven by the 
relative economic and political influence of the domestic business (broadly seen as 
favoring indigenization) and bureaucrats (favoring nationalization).111 
 By generalizing at this level, we do not want to downplay either the diversity of 
these two continents or the complexity of their political and economic histories.  We 
believe that studies investigating the types of political alliances could be extended to 
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other countries and periods.  By focusing the explanation on central analytical issues such 
as the longevity of the nation-state and the political influence of specific domestic 
constituencies, we construct a broad explanatory framework that allows business 




This paper proposes a model of alliances that support the expropriation of foreign private 
property in developing countries. We demonstrate how different types of expropriations 
correspond to strategies for political survival in which rulers need to ensure the support of 
their constituency. We categorize these alliances according to which stakeholders were 
mobilized around the government expropriation policies, who had a significant influence 
on the ultimate design of expropriation decrees, or expected rewards from the 
expropriation: labor unions, domestic businesses, or the public servants. Our 
categorization takes into account the legitimacy and longevity of the nation-state and the 
political importance of organized labor or domestic business.  Our research complements 
other studies that have focused on technological and host country institutional 
characteristics of the industry and the impact of the evolution of international commodity 
prices.  We extend and integrate these insights by comparing the African cases with Latin 
America, which highlights another dynamic, that between labor, party politics, and 
domestic business. This needs to be understood in terms of how economically developed 
these countries are, and how clearly defined and secure the concept of national identity 
and the nation-state is. We are aware that the type of alliances defined in this paper are 
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not the only possible ones, but we hope this paper will open the door for other scholars to 
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Table 2: Winning Alliances and Policies Towards Foreign Investors as 
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